jannikluhn:
I agree that ideally an unlinkable address is used, but I’m not convinced it’s necessary in practice. All Ethereum accounts are already public, which presumably is the bulk of the valuable information. The only additional information an attacker gets when observing a sealed transaction is that a particular user wants something to change which seems tiny in comparison. Also, probabilistic frontrunners open themselves up to counter attacks: Users could pretend to buy a token, anticipating to get front and backrun, but in actuality sell it, getting a great price at the cost of the attacker.
The issue is that an attacker might scan the transaction history for previous trades by the same person. E.g. imagine someone always swaps USDC → $SOME_TOKEN in the beginning of the month as part of a savings plan (buying USDC on a CEX, which does not list $SOME_TOKEN and then swapping on a DEX). Then if that account post an encrypted tx in the beginning of the month, an attacker has a very good idea of what that tx is going to do.
In such a case, the extra information about the sender actually actually adds a lot of valuable information rather than some tiny extra data. Of course, for other transactions the extra info might indeed not be very useful – but an attacker will specifically target those where the sender metadata is particularly helpful.
Regaring tricking/counter-attacking the probabilistic frontrunner to actually get a better price at the cost of the attacker: the point of probabilistic frontrunning is that you somewhat avoid this. The attacker may simply not reveal their own transaction in case their guess was wrong / they get counter-attacked. Of course, the attacker would have to pay a large tob_fee in that case, so this will at most give the counter-attacker that large tob_fee (otherwise they won’t reveal). So to act as a deterrent, you will have to counter-attack often or set tob_fee high (which means you have to burn high fees as an honest user). This will lead to an arms-race between front-runners trying to predict tx behaviour and counter-attackers trying to predict the frontrunners.
| # | Наименование новости | Тональность | Информативность | Дата публикации |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Repurposing FOCIL as an L2 forced transaction mechanism | 0 | 0 | 19-06-2026 |
| 2 | Exploring ownership fragmentation as a privacy primitive for the post-Pectra EVM | 0 | 0 | 23-06-2026 |
| 3 | Relationship-Anchored Money: Separating Symbolization from Securitization | 0 | 0 | 22-06-2026 |
| 4 | Etherveil - An Ethereum Privacy Browser | 0 | 0 | 21-06-2026 |
| 5 | Cooperative Capitalism Is the Last Coherent Economic Path Crypto Has Left | 0 | 0 | 23-06-2026 |
| 6 | Scaling in Hegota: using the ETH transfer to anchor execution and bandwidth | 0 | 0 | 19-06-2026 |
| 7 | Validator Redirected Revenue | 0 | 0 | 23-06-2026 |
| 8 | A native zkEVM scales bandwidth, not just execution | 0 | 0 | 22-06-2026 |
| 9 | Exploring the Design Space for a Post-Quantum Public Key Registry for Ethereum Validators | 0 | 0 | 22-06-2026 |
| 10 | ETH needs a supply cap at 128 million | 0 | 0 | 21-06-2026 |
