@Zealynx @Revinand Both are in the draft and the reference now (erc-credit-backer-hooks@259428f, and the PR, ethereum/ERCs#2111).
The fee stays last (Zealynx), for the reason you give: paying the lender’s income ahead of the backer’s principal makes backing a line worth less.
A backer the asset will not pay (Zealynx). You’re right, and it was worse than the Security Considerations line said: every recovery that reached the backer’s part reverted, and with the fee behind that part, so did the fee and the rest of the agent’s payments toward the loan. Pull costs one more call for the backer, a balance per backer, and a sum the lender has to keep out of what it lends. I think that is worth paying, because the push broke the draft’s own rule that a backer can stop money leaving, never money coming back. So recover now credits the backer’s part to dueToBacker(backer) and transfers nothing to the backer, and payBacker(backer), which anyone may call, pays it with a BackerPaid event, to the backer’s own address and no other, so the lender is never a way around a freeze. What is due to backers MUST NOT be lent, and availableCredit does not count it. In test_recover_frozenBacker_blocksNeitherTheRecoveryNorTheFee the backer is frozen after paying 10 at the default: a recovery of the whole amount due goes through and reaches the fee, and payBacker reverts while the address is frozen and pays the 10 once it is not. On c2c8337 that recovery reverts with the token’s freeze. test_dueToBacker_isNotLent covers the reserve.
Consents after a removal (Revinand). Yes to both. removeBacker now advances consentNonce, whoever calls it, so a raise signed before the removal cannot bring the backer back. revokeConsents(agentId), owner only, advances it at any time and emits ConsentsRevoked; that covers consents signed before any backing exists, which a removal cannot reach, and it leaves a backing in place alone. The test you asked for is test_removeBacker_voidsAConsentNotYetUsed: a raise to 80 is signed and not submitted, the owner removes the backer, and the backer’s setBacker with that signature reverts with BadConsent; the same after the backer removes itself. On c2c8337 the signature put the backer back. test_revokeConsents_byTheOwnerOnly_voidsConsentsNotYetUsed covers the new function and refuses the backer and a delegate. One effect to know: the nonce is per identity, so a backer that removes itself also voids a consent the owner signed for its replacement, and the owner signs again. I’d rather have that than a removal that leaves old consents live.
Four new tests, 83 in all; the five tests that expected the backer’s part to arrive inside recover now call payBacker. The interface id of IBackedCreditLine changes from 0x4efe38f1 to 0x9a4b754b; IAgentCreditLine does not.
| # | Наименование новости | Тональность | Информативность | Дата публикации |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | ERC-TBA: Credit-Matched Liquidity | 0 | 9.1 | 26-10-2026 |
| 2 | ERC-TBA: Agent Repay-First Payees | 0 | 10.22 | 25-10-2026 |
| 3 | ERC-8406: Fungible Agent Tokens | 0 | 5.7 | 25-10-2026 |
| 4 | ERC-8183: Agentic Commerce | 0 | 7.3 | 26-10-2026 |
| 5 | ERC-8226: Regulated Agent Mandate | 0 | 8.97 | 14-08-2026 |
| 6 | EIP Editing Office Hour (EIP + ERC ) Meeting #111, Aug 18, 2026 | 0 | 18.71 | 13-08-2026 |
| 7 | Pre-ERC: Adoption Profile and Reference Kernel for EOAs Adopting Code via SETCODEFROM | 0 | 7 | 25-10-2026 |
| 8 | ERC-8370: Inheritable Agent Mandates | 0 | 8.79 | 14-08-2026 |
| 9 | ERC-TBA: Agent Income Statements | 0 | 11.54 | 25-10-2026 |
| 10 | Draft ERC: Agent Safety Framework (ASF) — attributable adoption of versioned safety specifications | 0 | 5.29 | 26-10-2026 |