Просмотр новости
Найдите то, что Вас интересует
Спутники
РН
SpaceX
Роскосмос
NASA
СпутникиРНSpaceXРоскосмосNASA Hi @M1kuW1ll , Thank you for this rigorous simulation work. Comparing 1D shared-fee models against EIP-7999 under empirical demand anchors and slot propagation allocations provides the exact quantitative foundation needed to resolve the multi-dimensional fee debate post-Glamsterdam.
A few technical observations and takeaways on the equilibrium results:
1. Quantifying the “Cross-Resource Drag” in 1D Markets
The central takeaway from the comparative throughput data is the structural ceiling imposed by a shared base fee:
Even under refined state calibration (Floor-adjusted + EIP-8372 with a 550M limit at 3.5s), delivered execution plateaus at 177.9M, compared to 223.0M(historically anchored) and 272.6M (maximum-throughput) under EIP-7999.
Because state growth operates as the persistent bottleneck branch in equilibrium, a shared base fee forces pure execution and non-state-intensive transactions to bear the price response of state congestion. Decoupling resource base fees via EIP-7999 eliminates this cross-subsidy, unlocking an additional ~25% to ~53% in delivered execution without breaching the 120 GiB/year state boundary.
2. The 1D Alternating-Block Distortion
Your observation regarding asymmetric ratchet dynamics in 1D markets is critical:
When state demand averages 100% across two consecutive blocks, the 1D mechanism registers an effective average congestion of 125% due to reacting to \\max(\\text{gas}*{\\text{exec}}, \\text{gas}*{\\text{state}}) block-by-block.
This asymmetry introduces artificial volatility into the shared base fee during orthogonal demand shocks, over-suppressing subsequent mempool inclusion and leaving idle execution capacity on the table. Independent fake-exponential update rules under EIP-7999 naturally absorb these resource-specific fluctuations without cross-contaminating unrelated queues.
3. Fee Realities: Execution Unlocks vs. State Dominance
The fee distribution breakdown offers an essential clarification for broader community expectations:
EIP-7999 drops pure execution base fees dramatically (down to ~46–73 wei per execution gas), but because state writes account for >99% of total block fee charges in equilibrium, overall transaction costs for state-allocating operations will remain governed by the cost of long-term node disk footprint.
Framing EIP-7999 not as an across-the-board fee reduction, but as an insulation mechanism that protects lightweight compute, read-heavy queries, and ephemeral operations from paying the state-growth tax, will be critical for wallet developers and ecosystem alignment.
4. Data Floor Pricing vs. Dedicated Data Resources
The data charge comparison in the appendix highlights another friction in 1D adjustments:
Under the floor-adjusted 1D model (3.0s), compensating for ETH-transfer payload limits pushes the floor price to 96 gas/byte, yielding 8,469 wei/byte on counted calldata and Block Access Lists (BAL).
EIP-7999’s dedicated data resource brings this down to 743–1,169 wei/byte(~7x–11x cheaper). While both are well below historical blob congestion spikes, pricing data directly rather than forcing artificial transaction-level byte floors prevents unnecessary friction on calldata-dense execution.
Summary: This analysis makes a compelling empirical case that 1D shared-fee mechanisms—even with state normalization and floor calibrations—reach a hard efficiency limit due to cross-resource coupling. EIP-7999 provides the necessary degree of freedom to scale execution safely while holding state growth strictly to target.
| # | Наименование новости | Тональность | Информативность | Дата публикации |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | When Data Binds Execution: Dynamic Simulation of EIP-7999’s Multidimensional Fee Market | 0 | 10.98 | 16-09-2026 |
| 2 | Designs for EVM gas accounting in EIP-7999 | 0 | 4.9 | 08-09-2026 |
| 3 | Letting the base fee be a midpoint: a temporal liquidity authorization for EIP-1559 | 0 | 6.38 | 10-09-2026 |
| 4 | Mempool Account Transaction Capacity from Historical Activity (MATCHA) | 0 | 9.38 | 22-09-2026 |
| 5 | EIP-8411: what segmented payload diffusion is made of | 0 | 8.61 | 17-09-2026 |
| 6 | EIP-8037: State Creation Gas Cost Increase | 0 | 19.67 | 28-07-2026 |
| 7 | Proprietary AMMs and Ethereum | 0 | 10.18 | 08-09-2026 |
| 8 | From 60M to 200M: simulating Glamsterdam’s fee market | 0 | 7.26 | 16-09-2026 |
| 9 | ERC-8100: Representable Contract State | 0 | 5 | 08-07-2026 |
| 10 | EIP-7906: Transaction Assertions via State Diff Opcode | 0 | 7 | 09-07-2026 |