Everett Kelley, national president of the American Federation of Government Employees, speaks during a rally outside a Social Security Administration building in Wilkes-Barre, Pa., on Aug. 14, 2025. AFGE is part of a coalition of federal employee unions that sued to block the new rules. Jason Ardan/The Citizens' Voice via Getty Images

A federal judge in Massachusetts on Monday struck down an effort by the Trump administration to exert greater political control over union elections at federal agencies, finding that the agency’s regulatory changes were “arbitrary and capricious” under federal law.

Since 1983, representational matters—like requests to conduct a union election or for workers to choose from between multiple labor groups—have been primarily handled by the Federal Labor Relations Authority’s cadre of regional directors and their career staff. Appeals stemming from a petition—or subsequent election—are handled by the FLRA’s three-member board of political appointees, who are subject to Senate confirmation.

But in March, the FLRA issued an interim final rule that stripped its regional directors of their authority to act in these cases, stating that beginning the following month, regional directors would work “collaboratively” with political leadership to process representation petitions, with the three-member board having the final say. Under the new regulations, appeals would only be available in instances when the FLRA’s board lacks a two-member quorum, which the agency claimed would be more efficient.

A coalition of federal employee unions sued to block the new rules in April, contending violations of the Administrative Procedure Act, the federal law requiring agency policy changes to be well-reasoned and communicated, arguing that saddling the three-member authority with hundreds of new cases would make the union election process less, not more, efficient. And since unlike most FLRA cases, those involving representational matters may not be appealed to federal appellate courts, the rule leaves unions without redress in the face of a wrongful decision.

U.S. District Judge Denise Caspar on Monday sided with the labor groups, finding that the FLRA’s justification for the rule was undercut by the agency’s own data. In 2025, 277 representation petitions were filed with agency regional directors, of which only six were appealed to the authority’s three-member board. And by the agency’s own admission, it anticipates only five appeals in representation cases for all of 2026 and 2027.

“Although in the realm of procedure, agencies are presumed to have special competence and, accordingly, are held to less exacting standards of explication . . . courts are not willing to ignore matters that are common knowledge,” Caspar wrote. “Here, it is a matter of ‘common knowledge’ that changing from a system in which multiple regional directors are deciding matters to one in which the authority must reach a collective decision on all representation matters will increase not just the authority’s caseload, but the processing and adjudication times for representation matters as well. The FLRA has provided neither an explanation nor data to suggest otherwise.”

Caspar also found that the FLRA failed to take into consideration the fact that unions and federal employees have to come to rely on the existing union election process—and the ability to appeal a regional director’s decision to the three-member board—over the last four decades. While agencies are not required to preserve a regulation or process due to those “reliance interests,” the Administrative Procedure Act requires agencies consider and address them when making changes.

“The FLRA only states that ‘because the authority will be performing the [representation] functions itself, rather than delegating them to the RDs, an appeals process will no longer be necessary,” Caspar wrote. “There is no indication from the record that the FLRA considered the reliance interests that plaintiffs raise here. While the FLRA was, of course, under no obligation to conclude that these reliance interests outweighed any particular policy concerns, making that difficult decision was the FLRA’s job, but the FLRA failed to do it.”

Caspar’s ruling effectively nullifies the FLRA’s March rule and amendment to its delegation of authority, and tasks the agency and unions with collaborating on a final order formally vacating the regulations.