Life used to be so much simpler.

Back in the days of yore, when a man loved a woman and vice versa, or even if lust was all that brewed the steaming tea or corporeal desire, the product that often resulted was seven pounds or so of bouncing baby joy.

To be sure, while the traditional methods of conception remain en vogue, modern medicine has afforded other perhaps less romantic means of baby-making, chief among them the miracles of egg extraction and artificial insemination. 

Often, couples struggling to conceive have resorted to one assistive means or another to bring forth the miracle of life. Sometimes, though, instead of couples equally committed to the task, a woman wishing to conceive must — or elects to — reach out to a friend or even a stranger to prime the proverbial insemination pump. What so doing has perhaps predictably created is heretofore unknown complications in the law.

Traditionally, if a couple — whether lovers or near strangers — make a baby, each is equally responsible for it at the least financially. In Colorado, a one-night stand may well result in 18 full years of child support. Intended or not, if a bundle of joy results, even from a temporary tryst, one’s checkbook will be impacted.

While the foregoing applies equally whether the baby was conceived traditionally or by some artificial means, what if the sperm donor did not intend to be the child’s parent (or in any way responsible for him or her) but, instead, wished only to facilitate the pregnancy without further obligation?

Generally, there are two circumstances where this might occur. The first is in the commercial setting. Some fertility clinics may offer a veritable catalog of potential sperm donors … for a price. Second, at times when a couple cannot conceive by traditional means, where one of the parties is infertile, or where a single woman or gay couple wishes to bear (rather than adopt) a child, they may ask a friend to donate. And this is where, shall we say, things might get a little sticky.

But, wait! There’s an “app” for that.

Colorado Revised Statutes (“C.R.S.”) Section 19-3-103 provides that unless one of two conditions are met, as articulated in another section of the Code, a sperm donor (using artificial insemination) must be presumed to not be what the statutes refer to as an “intending parent.” If, by the act of sperm donation, the donor does not “intend” to rear and support any resultant child — “Hey, I was just helpin’ a sister out!” — he will not be burdened with any financial or other obligations.

So what, you may rightfully be asking, are those two conditions?

They may be found in C.R.S. Section 19-4-106 to which there is a Part One and a Part Two.

Part one of the Section provides as follows: “If, with the consent of another intended parent, an intended parent consents to become pregnant through an assisted reproductive procedure, the intended parent who does not give birth is treated in law as the natural parent of the child conceived.” It then goes on to say that “The consent of both the intended parent who will give birth and the other intended parent must be in writing and signed by each such party, except as provided in subsection (3) of this section.” So a written agreement here is key.

The second part goes like this: “Failure of the intended parent to sign a consent required by subsection (1) of this section before or after the birth of the child does not preclude a finding that the intended parent is the parent if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that, prior to the conception of the child, the parent who gave birth and the intended parent had an oral agreement that both would be parents of the child and that the child was conceived through an assisted reproductive procedure.” There are two keys here: first, the agreement must have been reached to co-parent the child prior to conception of the child and, second, if there arises a dispute, the donor’s intent and agreement to co-parent must be proved by “clear and convincing” evidence.

Here, a quick aside on standards of proof.

In most civil (that is non-criminal matters), the usual standard is a “preponderance of the evidence” which some have called a featherweight more on one side of the judicial scales in favor of the proposition than on the scale in opposition. In criminal actions, the standard is “clear and convincing,” which may be thought of as “there is no other reasonable explanation.” “Clear and convincing” is a tweener. It is more than a preponderance, but not so much as “beyond a reasonable doubt.” What it means is that the evidence must make the proposition highly and substantially more likely to be true than untrue. In other words, the finder must be convinced that the contention is highly probable. If this standard cannot be met, the sperm donor will be deemed just that and not the baby daddy.

Of course, the clearest way to avoid dispute — other than just saying “no” in the first place — is an unequivocal agreement between recipient and donor that says something like UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCE WHATSOEVER, DO I INTEND TO BE A PARENT TO OR SUPPORT ANY CHILD WHO MAY RESULT FROM MY SPERM DONATION!!”

It’s a brave and oft confusing new world out there.

Tread lightly.