Interesting idea.
Some questions:
How is the initial threshold supposed to be determined? If its not set correctly, the reporter loses their liquidity, disincentivizing them submit the initial report.
What prevents someone from choosing an extremely high threshold and then simply collecting the reward if theres insufficient competition?
How can ETH’s purchasing power be distinguished from a change in compute costs / hardware efficiency?
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