On October 5, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan moved ahead to activate their defense commitments and provide military capabilities agreed under the Mecca Defense Alliance. The decision came after weeks of Houthi drone and missile strikes against Saudi Arabia, even as the Houthis were ramping up their ground operations along the Red Sea coast.

Regardless of how the crisis plays out, the Houthi conflict has turned out to be the first major test of the Mecca Pact. The alliance must strike a balance. It has to demonstrate that its commitments have real military value without crossing the line into becoming an interventionist force or getting bogged down in a prolonged war of attrition.

For Pakistan, the Houthi crisis is a particularly difficult strategic problem.

There is broad agreement within Pakistan’s strategic community that the Mecca Pact is defensive rather than offensive. However, Pakistan cannot simply sit on the sidelines as the regional security environment goes downhill and its own defensive commitments come under strain. If the alliance cannot show up when one of its members faces a serious security challenge, its deterrent value could quickly erode.

At the same time, Pakistan is alive to the costs of direct intervention. Deploying large numbers of troops into Yemen would pile on additional pressure on an already stretched military, which is grappling with counterterrorism challenges at home and the threat from India. It could also put a strain on its relations with Iran and, perhaps most importantly, lock Islamabad into a commitment from which it would find it difficult to pull out without paying a heavy strategic price.

Diplomatically, Islamabad is trying to persuade Iran into restraining the Houthis. Nonetheless, there are limits to what Tehran can or is willing to do. Iranian influence over Houthi decision-making is significant but is not unlimited. The Houthis have an axe to grind when it comes to Saudi Arabia. Moreover, Tehran has little obvious incentive to do away with a source of pressure on Saudi Arabia while it is itself preparing for another round with the United States. Therefore, diplomacy is unlikely to resolve the crisis on its own.

Pakistan must demonstrate that the Mecca Pact has real teeth and practical military value. To understand what that support might look like, it is necessary to understand the alliance’s objectives and the means available to achieve them.

Pakistan understands that wiping out the Houthis altogether is neither realistic nor desirable. Even if such an objective were militarily achievable, the costs would be high. Sustained Houthi attacks on Saudi energy infrastructure, combined with the consequences of further stoking Yemen’s civil war, could make the price of total military victory prohibitively high.

The more realistic objective, therefore, is to constrain the Houthis’ ability to dominate the Bab al-Mandeb and tip the military balance sufficiently to open up space for a political settlement.

Any military support that Pakistan or Türkiye provides to Saudi Arabia or Saudi-backed forces in Yemen should be understood in this light.

Operationally, it would make little sense for Pakistan to send in large conventional ground forces to Yemen simply to put the brakes on Houthi advances. The decisive fighting is taking place in southwestern Yemen, particularly around Taiz and Mocha. These areas are far from the Saudi border. Operating a large Pakistani expeditionary force there would be logistically difficult and risky.

What is needed instead is a capable and better-organized anti-Houthi force in southwestern Yemen. This is where Pakistan and Türkiye can add value. Both countries can supply weapons and other military assistance to Saudi-backed forces, beefing up their ability to conduct counteroffensives. They can also help with command-and-control structures, where weaknesses have contributed to the inability of anti-Houthi forces to push back against recent Houthi advances.

Pakistan also has extensive experience with special operations and counterterrorism, particularly from its campaigns in Afghanistan. Türkiye, meanwhile, has built up considerable experience operating specialized forces in Syria and Iraq. Therefore, both could provide specialized personnel and advisers potentially inside Yemen without committing to large conventional formations. In this sense, Pakistan and Türkiye could contribute through force augmentation rather than direct intervention.

Another potential priority would be breaking up Houthi command structures. The Houthis have become more organized and militarily sophisticated, but they still retain many characteristics of a networked armed movement. Weakening their command and communications could pay off more than attempting to wear down the organization through conventional territorial warfare alone. Pakistan and Türkiye’s intelligence-gathering experience could offer useful lessons for Saudi Arabia and its local partners in this regard.

The alliance must also brace for further attacks on Saudi energy infrastructure. Saudi Arabia’s air-defense network could come under increasing pressure if Houthi missile and drone attacks intensify. Already, Saudi air-defense stockpiles are thinned due to Iranian attacks and continued Houthi onslaughts. Therefore, Pakistan and Türkiye would provide additional air-defense capabilities and personnel to shield critical infrastructure and strategic facilities.

Saudi Arabia already has a substantial air force and does not necessarily require Pakistani fighter aircraft or pilots. What it needs more urgently is support in battlefield operational planning, target identification and air-combat support functions. Such assistance could improve both the effectiveness and intensity of Saudi air operations.

This broader role explains why deployment of as many as 40,000 Pakistani troops should not be read as preparation for a conventional Pakistani ground war in Yemen.

Nonetheless, there are limits to what Pakistan can pull off. The operationalization of the Mecca Pact’s joint command remains in its infancy. Moreover, it is unclear how effectively Pakistan’s military capabilities can be integrated into a conflict with a very different geography and political environment. Pakistan also has considerably less experience in indirectly shaping a battlefield by strengthening another state’s forces.

There is another uncertainty. The strategic objectives of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia may not stay in lockstep as the conflict evolves. Riyadh may ultimately seek to tip the balance of power in Yemen decisively in its favor. Islamabad, by contrast, is likely to remain committed to its defense obligations while seeking to steer clear of a prolonged military commitment. The two countries’ objectives may overlap during the initial phase of the crisis, but they could diverge as the conflict drags on.

A far more serious crisis could flare up if Iran or its allies in Iraq move to support the Houthis. Iraqi militias have already attacked Saudi Arabia several times, including strikes on the East-West Crude Oil Pipeline. While Iran’s direct intervention remains off the table for the moment, the situation would change if the US resumes massive strikes on Iran, including on energy infrastructure. Iran will surely hit back at Gulf energy infrastructure, Saudi Arabia’s included. The conflict would then spill over beyond Yemen.

How the Mecca Defense Alliance manages the Houthi crisis will shape not only the integrity of the Mecca Pact but also its credibility as a foundation for the emerging regional security order.