What’s different about the US anti-drug strategy in Ecuador?

Is Keiko Fujimori delivering on her tough-on-crime campaign promises in Peru?

Can Bolivia’s new government rein in its coca boom?

This week’s top three organized crime stories in On the Radar.

The US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) sank another Ecuadorian vessel on Monday, after its crew members were removed, alleging that it was a “floating refueling station” supporting drug trafficking on behalf of the Choneros, one of Ecuador’s largest criminal groups. The crew members’ families and boat owners have denied any ties to organized crime. US forces have boarded, evacuated, and sunk at least five boats so far in September.

These joint US-Ecuador operations are part of Washington’s deepening security partnership with Quito, formalized under the “Shield of the Americas” framework. But unlike the broader US campaign on boats in the Caribbean and Pacific, which has involved lethal missile strikes that have killed at least 227 people over the past year, these recent operations have focused on boarding boats and detaining crews before sinking them. 

President Keiko Fujimori’s government declared a 60-day state of emergency in five high-security prisons—Challapalca, Cochamarca, Miguel Castro Castro, Ancón I, and Trujillo Varones—where there is a large number of alleged leaders or members of criminal organizations. The decree suspends constitutional rights to free movement, assembly, and personal security within 200 meters of the prisons, and sends troops to guard their perimeters after officials said gang leaders continue directing extortion, contract killings, and drug trafficking from behind bars.

The move is the first concrete step in Fujimori’s promised tough-on-crime approach to Peru’s penitentiaries, which also includes plans for new mega-prisons modeled on El Salvador’s CECOT. But more security on the outside of Peru’s overcrowded and understaffed prisons may do little to disrupt criminal command structures embedded inside. The new decree fits a broader regional pattern of leaders adopting harder-edged security postures—echoing not only President Nayib Bukele’s model in El Salvador but also the Trump administration’s own rhetoric on organized crime in the region. 

Coca cultivation in Bolivia grew 7% in 2025, reaching 36,400 hectares, 14,400 hectares above the legal limit, according to a UNODC crop monitoring report. The growth was concentrated in Cochabamba, a traditional coca-growing region and stronghold of ousted MAS leader Evo Morales. The report was unveiled alongside a new, $492 million Bolivian government counternarcotics strategy for 2026–2030, funded jointly by the state and international cooperation.

Interior Minister Marco Antonio Oviedo said the new policy would operate under principles of “sovereignty” and “non-interference,” with international cooperation aimed at strengthening national capacities, according to EFE. The framing echoes Bolivia’s long-standing wariness of US involvement in its drug policy: Evo Morales expelled the DEA outright in 2008. But under President Rodrigo Paz, Bolivia has welcomed the DEA back, announcing fresh cooperation with the agency that covers illicit financing, trafficking routes, and criminal networks.