Critical minerals have quietly become the raw material of India’s economic ambitions. From the solar mission to the electric vehicle (EV) and battery ecosystem to shipbuilding and defence, every flagship programme of India now runs, directly or indirectly, on a short list of minerals, including silicon, tellurium, indium, lithium, cobalt, and others. These minerals are central to the country’s energy transition, industrialisation, technological innovation, strategic autonomy, and national security. However, their asymmetric geographic distribution and associated export restrictions add to the urgency of securing supply chains.

India, though a latecomer, has stopped being a passive observer of this race. In 2025, it launched the National Critical Minerals Mission, an umbrella framework with a total outlay of Rs 34,300 crore over seven years, including Rs 7,000 crore for 1,200 anticipated domestic exploration projects. Yet, India’s critical minerals policy still rests on one institutional instrument—a list of 30 critical minerals released by the Ministry of Mines in 2023. This list of critical minerals (LCM) mentions scarce elements that are essential to domestic manufacturing. Designing and pursuing the LCM is a well-thought-out step; however, certain gaps in this list require attention.

The first and foremost is the determination of an appropriate, robust methodology for identifying the critical minerals. For LCM 2023 identification, India followed a three-stage process. The first step was a comparative study of the criticality assessments of different countries, followed by inter-ministerial consultation in the second stage, and finally, an empirical evaluation of criticality using two main criteria: economic importance and supply risk, replicating the EU methodology. In this way, the first selected set of 69 elements was reduced to a final set of 30. Though India’s current framework of benchmarking and consultation seems, prima facie, appropriate, it must be broadened further to bring resilience.

The other major countries have adopted transparent, data-driven, and periodically revised frameworks. The US has progressively refined its methodology for critical mineral identification. The 2018 quantitative framework of the US, with two indicators—the concentration of global mineral production and net import reliance—culminated in a risk modeling framework in 2022, which was further improved in 2025 by quantifying the probability-weighted GDP (gross domestic product) loss from mineral supply disruption simulated through 1,200 scenarios. The EU’s approach, running since 2011 and refreshed every three years, scores each material on two published axes—economic importance and supply risk—built on import concentration, producer-country governance quality, and others.

What distinguishes these frameworks is not only the comprehensive methodology but also the discipline behind it: methodologies that are public, reproducible, and revised on a fixed schedule. On the other hand, India’s current methodology, borrowed from the EU, might have been more suited to the EU’s needs than India’s. Also, the current framework, reducing the final set of minerals to 30, leaves a space for opaqueness and non-producibility.

Another issue is that India has not updated its LCM list, even with the existing methodology. Also, India lacks a legal mandate for revisiting the list. The US is legally required to review its methodology and list at least every three years under the Energy Act of 2020. The EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act imposes the same three-year statutory review cycle. India’s own 2023 committee recommended updating the list, preferably “every three years.” However, it is just a recommendation, not a legal mandate. The LCM items have grown from 35 to 60 in the US, while the EU has updated its LCM from 14 minerals to 34, but India has kept the same list of 30 minerals.

The global trade order is changing very rapidly. The scenario that existed three years ago may no longer be valid today. A static LCM framework may weaken industrial policy due to market and policy misalignment, lessen manufacturing competitiveness because of input procurement uncertainty and increased production costs, enlarge supply-chain vulnerabilities, and demoralise investments in the sector. It may also increase exposure to export restrictions on critical raw materials, which have increased multifold in recent years. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), such restrictions have gone up fivefold since 2009, with approximately 16% of global trade for critical minerals facing at least one restriction in the period from 2022 to 2024, in contrast to roughly 12% in 2009-2011.

Therefore, going forward, India must adopt a proactive approach. First is the revision of the LCM methodology. India may continue with the sandwich approach, combining India-customised robust quantification with transparent and publicly available consultation. Second is regular updating and publication of the list, preferably at intervals of less than three years, backed by legal architecture to make India more economically resilient. Third, given the geoeconomic stakes, India should think futuristically and may adopt a two-tier approach. Tier I will have the LCM, while Tier II may be a “Critical Minerals Watchlist” comprising minerals that are not currently critical but have the potential to become so. These minerals may be included either based on their application to new technologies or increasing concentration of production or export restrictions.

E.g., manganese was excluded from the 2023 list due to adequate domestic availability, yet India still imports about 50% of its needs, while roughly 70% of global manganese exports face at least one restriction. Magnesium and boron warrant similar monitoring, given their concentrated production. These minerals may not meet the current LCM criteria, but a watchlist would allow India to track supply risks before they materialise. Finally, as a major agriculture-producing country, India has rightly added potash and phosphorus to its list, but food-security minerals remain a small share of it. Therefore, agri-related minerals should be given more weight in LCM design.

India cannot risk its industrial ambitions and environmental commitments by having a static framework, particularly when the global order is fragmenting and protectionism is rising. A comprehensive and dynamic LCM framework will act as an enabler for securing strategic supply chains. India has entered the third year since the launch of the first LCM, making it high time to design a criticality framework better suited to its needs.

Himanshu Jaiswal is a Consultant at the Center for Social and Economic Progress (CSEP), New Delhi; Namita and Deeksha are Research Assistants at the Research and Information systems (RIS), New Delhi.