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СпутникиРНSpaceXРоскосмосNASAInsights from Tom Wells.
The Diplomat author Mercy Kuo regularly engages subject-matter experts, policy practitioners, and strategic thinkers across the globe for their diverse insights into U.S. Asia policy. This conversation with Dr. Tom Wells – author of “The Kissinger Tapes: Inside His Secretly Recorded Phone Conversations” (Oxford 2026) – is the 506th in “The Trans-Pacific View Insight Series.”
What do Henry Kissinger’s tapes reveal about his realpolitik savoir-faire?
Kissinger’s phone transcripts show his preeminent concern for limiting Soviet influence in the world while also achieving détente with the Soviet Union. He tended to see conflicts around the world in light of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry and to overestimate the Soviet Union’s role in these conflicts, e.g., the India-Pakistan conflict, the Jordan crisis over the Palestinian insurgency there, the Vietnam War.
Morality was basically a non-factor in his policies. Advancing American national interests, as he viewed them, was central. He saw himself as maintaining a stable balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union with China being a lesser power than the Soviet Union at the time, and viewed the application of American power as critical to advancing America’s interests.
He had superior skills as a diplomat, and his fortitude in protracted negotiations was impressive, but he also used deception to achieve his goals. He seemed to care little about the human costs of his policies. In Vietnam, he was callous to civilian casualties and seemed to be concerned about them only to the extent that they provoked domestic and international condemnation.
Describe the dynamics between President Richard Nixon and Kissinger on the tapes.
Kissinger was invariably deferential to Nixon and always addressed him as “Mr. President.” He was quite disciplined about acting deferential and subservient. He praised Nixon frequently for his “toughness,” courage, insights, speeches, and so on, but Nixon doubted Kissinger’s sincerity and loyalty. They had an uneasy and mutually distrustful relationship, and there was a good deal of tension between them. Nixon was sometimes short, snappish, and impatient with Kissinger. But Kissinger couldn’t afford to act that way with Nixon: his standing with Nixon was always a major concern.
Kissinger was somewhat insecure about their relationship, which Nixon fostered, and practiced self-restraint when Nixon made dubious claims or requests, though he sometimes laughed or complained bitterly about Nixon behind his back (for example, about public remarks or orders by Nixon that he disagreed with, or over Nixon’s failure to back him in his relentless and tiresome battle with Secretary of State William Rogers). But Nixon knew Kissinger was indispensable to him and thought his many skills outweighed the headaches he caused him.
Examine the tapes’ intriguing insights into Nixon and Kissinger’s decision-making behind facilitating China-U.S. rapprochement.
Nixon and Kissinger were concerned about appearing too eager with the Chinese for fear that China would then go “back into a shell,” as Kissinger put it. Nixon wanted to play it “very cool and aloof” with the Chinese, while conveying that the door to rapprochement was now open. “We’re not going overboard but we’re saying, well, if they open the door, we’ll open the door,” Nixon told Kissinger.
They hoped that opening relations with China, including holding a summit, would help them with their “Soviet game,” and lead the Soviets to be more eager to pursue détente and hold a summit with them too. Kissinger saw their China policy as dependent on their Soviet policy and vice versa and felt that when they made a move toward the Soviets, the Chinese tended to move more towards them.
They also understood that they needed a diversion from Vietnam at home, particularly after the disastrous Laos invasion, which took place shortly before the China opening and for which they took heavy criticism. Kissinger told Nixon they were quieting intellectuals and journalists by the opening [to China].
They debated who they should send as an envoy to China to prepare for the summit, with Nixon concerned that this prior visit, which Kissinger made, could detract from his summit meeting. Kissinger and Nixon reveled in their China opening and the applause it received at home, and felt it bought them more time on Vietnam. It was their high point.
Analyze how the tapes capture Nixon and Kissinger’s concerns over risks to the China-U.S. summit in 1972.
Nixon and Kissinger debated how mysterious political developments in China in September 1971 – the possibilities ranged from Mao’s death to a power struggle to preparations against a possible Soviet attack (it turned out several top Chinese leaders had been ousted) – could affect the summit, even potentially lead to its cancellation.
Regarding the summit’s risks at home, the risks were mainly with the political right in the United States, though Nixon was also concerned to a degree about broad public opinion. Kissinger had to convince prominent conservatives, including senators like Barry Goldwater, the public intellectual William F. Buckley, and California Governor Ronald Reagan, that they were not abandoning Taiwan and their commitment to Taiwan’s defense. (The Shanghai Communique released at the end of the summit said the United States acknowledged that Taiwan was part of China and that its ultimate objective was the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from there.) But Kissinger told Nixon they had to be “cold” about Taiwan. Another risk was that they might not be able to come to a satisfactory public resolution of their disagreements with China over Taiwan at the summit, at least one that did not upset too many Americans. But the potential benefits of the summit far outweighed the risks.
Assess how the tapes illuminate Kissinger’s calculations in preserving political power to shape U.S. foreign policy and specifically U.S. China policy.
Kissinger maintained his political power mainly by demonstrating his indispensability to Nixon: through his extraordinarily hard work, tremendous intellect and analytical abilities, diplomatic skills, PR efforts and adeptness at handling the press, coldness in pursuit of their goals, shared lack of concern for morality when advancing American interests as they saw them, secrecy, and other traits. Plus, he continually undermined Secretary of State William Rogers to maintain his dominance over U.S. foreign policymaking.
Though it had been Nixon’s idea to explore opening relations with China, Kissinger had mainly carried out the policy and did the legwork, including through his two trips to China in 1971 to arrange and prepare for the summit.
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