By Taekyoon Kim - 12 August 2026

Mark Carney’s warning at Davos in 2026 was memorable for a reason. Middle powers, he argued, risk finding themselves “on the menu” unless they secure a place at the table. The phrase captured a growing anxiety. As great-power competition intensifies, countries outside the top tier increasingly worry that decisions will be made around them rather than with them.

The speech also brought middle-power cooperation back into fashion. Commentators and scholars began to ask not only whether middle powers should work together, but what such cooperation should actually look like. Calls for “principled and pragmatic” collective action gained new urgency. Carney’s warning should therefore be read as more than a clever turn of phrase. It is an early warning for middle powers navigating a world that is becoming more fragmented, more polarized and less forgiving.

Against this backdrop, MIKTA faces an important moment of quiet reassessment. Since launching MIKTA as a cross-regional grouping of G20 members in 2013, Mexico, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Türkiye and Australia have sought to give middle-power diplomacy practical purpose. Together, they have defended multilateral cooperation, built consensus across regional divides and added a collective voice to pressing global debates. In so doing, they generally described their cooperation through the language of middle-power diplomacy. That language still carries value, but no longer tells the whole story.

The term “middle power” describes a country’s place in the international hierarchy. It usually refers to states that lack the military and economic reach of great powers but still possess enough diplomatic influence to shape coalitions, institutions and international rules. The concept has a distinguished history. Middle powers have often defended multilateral institutions, mediated disputes and supported collective responses to common problems.

Yet the category has become increasingly elastic. Governments, analysts and commentators now apply the term to a wide range of states, often without agreeing on what qualifies a country as a middle power. The label can therefore provide recognition without offering much strategic direction. It tells us something about where a country stands. It says far less about what that country should do.

MIKTA’s future relevance will depend less on the status of its members than on the practical value of their cooperation. A bridge matters only when people can use it. MIKTA already has the foundations of such a bridge. Its members come from different regions, political traditions and development experiences. They all sit in the G20. They also maintain extensive links across the United Nations and regional institutions. Few compact forums bring together political constituencies from Latin America, Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, Eurasia and the Pacific.

MIKTA should gradually move beyond its current role as a consultation platform. In its place, it could become a forward-looking vehicle for principled and pragmatic action. Its aim would not be to compete with larger powers. It would be to preserve the political and diplomatic space in which cooperation remains possible, even when great-power rivalry deepens.

One useful way to define this role is to think of MIKTA as a “resilient democratic connector,” or RDC. The phrase is not intended as a new slogan. It describes three practical functions.

Resilience means maintaining cooperation during periods of geopolitical stress. A resilient partnership does not require complete agreement among its members. It keeps diplomatic channels open when interests diverge. It also reduces excessive dependence on any single power or institution by widening networks and diversifying partnerships.

The democratic element should describe how MIKTA acts, not merely how its members define themselves. Middle powers derive much of their influence not from coercion, but from diplomatic credibility, coalition-building and sustained engagement with international institutions. An RDC should therefore combine minilateral agility with democratic discipline: transparent decision-making, public accountability, civic participation, and adherence to the rule of law. Practised in this way, democratic cooperation would enable MIKTA to provide global public goods, uphold multilateral norms and connect Northern capabilities with Southern priorities.

The connector function is the most important. MIKTA can link the United Nations and the G20, regional organizations and global institutions, and governments and non-state actors. It can also help carry policy ideas across political, geographic and institutional divides.

This changes the central question. Traditional middle-power diplomacy asks how much influence a state possesses. The RDC approach asks what a partnership can connect, protect and make possible. MIKTA does not need to discard its middle-power identity. But it should regard that identity as a starting point, not an end in itself. This RDC-based connective role is particularly relevant to the persistent divide between the Global North and the Global South.

The Global North and South are imperfect categories. Neither forms a coherent bloc. Both contain countries with widely different levels of wealth, political systems and strategic interests. Still, the distinction continues to shape development diplomacy. Disagreements over climate responsibility, debt, trade, technology, finance and institutional reform often fall along a North–South fault line.

Northern governments frequently emphasize governance, accountability and measurable results. Southern governments tend to stress historical responsibility, decoloniality, representation and access to finance. These priorities do not always conflict. But governments often express them through different institutions and political vocabularies.

MIKTA is well placed to help narrow this gap. Its membership spans advanced, emerging and developing economies. Its members also bring experience from regions that do not often speak through a single diplomatic platform.

The group should approach this role with some humility. It cannot claim to speak for the Global South. Nor can it resolve every dispute between North and South. Its role should be more practical. A connector helps others speak to one another.

MIKTA could bring Southern governments, local authorities and civil-society organizations into discussions where financial and institutional rules are shaped. It could also help Northern partners better understand demands for policy autonomy, national ownership and fairer representation. The exchange must work in both directions. Development knowledge does not simply travel from North to South, but also through South-South and triangular cooperation. Southern countries have developed important innovations in digital governance, social protection, public health and climate adaptation.

The negotiations over the development agenda beyond 2030 offer a practical test of MIKTA’s connective approach. The 2030 Agenda created a universal framework for sustainable development. It linked economic prosperity to poverty reduction, equality, peace, institutions and environmental protection. Its commitment to leave no one behind also provided a shared moral language.

The next development framework will be harder to negotiate. Governments are likely to disagree over financing, technology, national responsibility and the number and scope of future goals. Geopolitical rivalry will make compromise more difficult.

MIKTA is unable to attempt to design the entire post-2030 agenda. It can, however, help create the conditions for a more inclusive negotiation. One possible first step would be a concise North–South compact. Such a document could defend universality, human rights, gender equality, national ownership and the rule of law. At the same time, it should recognize different national circumstances and the legitimate need for policy space. The compact should remain focused. An ever-expanding list of promises would serve little purpose. Each major commitment should identify the resources, institutions and measurable outcomes required for implementation.

MIKTA could also organize regional consultations. Each member could convene governments, local authorities, young people, scholars, civil-society organizations and businesses from its surrounding region. These discussions should not manufacture a false consensus. They should identify where interests converge and where they remain apart. Diplomacy often advances not by eliminating disagreement, but by making it manageable.

A North–South knowledge partnership could follow. Climate adaptation, digital public infrastructure, health security and resilient food systems would provide sensible starting points. Joint pilot projects could be designed, rather than exported from one region to another.

Ultimately, MIKTA’s credibility will rest on what it delivers. MIKTA does not need a large permanent secretariat. Too much bureaucracy could weaken the flexibility that makes the group useful. It does, however, need greater continuity. A rolling three-year program could prevent priorities from changing with each rotating chair. Individual members could lead specific workstreams. A small network of seconded officials could preserve institutional memory.

The MIKTA Development Cooperation Institutions Network could support this process. It could link foreign ministries with development agencies, finance ministries and statistical offices. Universities, civil society, local authorities and businesses should also have a role.

An annual RDC scorecard would add a measure of accountability. It could record projects completed, funds mobilized, institutions connected and communities reached. It could also assess participation, transparency and safeguards for rights. A scorecard would not eliminate political disagreement. It would, however, make it harder for the group to substitute statements for results.

MIKTA should also remain open to cooperation with nonmembers. United Nations agencies, development banks, regional organizations and interested like-minded governments could join individual initiatives. Open participation would reinforce the group’s identity as a connector rather than an exclusive bloc. 

MIKTA will not transform the international order on its own. Nor should it try. Its contribution would be more modest, but no less meaningful. It can preserve channels when larger powers close them. It can bring together policy communities that rarely meet. It can also demonstrate that values-based cooperation does not require rigid geopolitical alignment.

The post-2030 negotiations will show whether this potential can become practice. Success will not come from a single summit or declaration. It will require patient institution-building, sustained consultation and visible results. Thus, MIKTA does not need to reinvent itself overnight. It should begin by clarifying its purpose, choosing a small number of practical tasks and demonstrating their value.

Middle-power diplomacy explains how MIKTA entered the global conversation. A resilient democratic connector may offer a more compelling account of how it can remain there — as a careful, credible and useful bridge between the Global North and South.

Taekyoon Kim is a South Korean diplomat and scholar based in Bern, Switzerland. He serves as Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to Switzerland and Liechtenstein. Before entering diplomatic service, he taught international development at Seoul National University for 15 years. His work examines global development governance, middle-power diplomacy and North-South relations. 

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